Does the Prosperity of a Country Play a Role in COVID-19 Outcomes? by Khorram-Manesh, Amir et al.
Florida International University 
FIU Digital Commons 
Coronavirus Research at FIU 
8-12-2020 
Does the Prosperity of a Country Play a Role in COVID-19 
Outcomes? 
Amir Khorram-Manesh 
Eric Carlstrom 
Attila J. Hertelendy 
Krysztof Goniewicz 
Carter B. Casady 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/covid-19_research 
This work is brought to you for free and open access by FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Coronavirus Research at FIU by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact dcc@fiu.edu. 
Authors 
Amir Khorram-Manesh, Eric Carlstrom, Attila J. Hertelendy, Krysztof Goniewicz, Carter B. Casady, and 
Frederick M. Burkle 
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 1
©Society for DisasterMedicine andPublic Health, Inc. 2020. This is anOpenAccess article, distributed under the termsof the Creative Commons
Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
Does the Prosperity of a Country Play a Role
in COVID-19 Outcomes?
Amir Khorram-Manesh, MD, PhD ; Eric Carlström, RN, MSc, PhD;
Attila J. Hertelendy, PhD; Krzysztof Goniewicz, PhD ; Carter B. Casady, PhD ;
Frederick M. Burkle, Jr., MD, MPH, DTM, FAAP, FACEP
ABSTRACT
Objective: This study aims to clarify the association between prosperity and the coronavirus disease
(COVID-19) outcomes and its impact on the future management of pandemics.
Methods: This is an observational study using information from 2 online registries. The numbers
of infected individuals and deaths and the prosperity rank of each country were obtained from
worldometer.info and the Legatum Institute’s Prosperity Index, respectively.
Results: There is a combination of countries with high and low prosperity on the list of COVID-19-infected
countries. The risk of the virus pandemic seems to be more extensive in countries with high prosperity.
A Spearman’s rho test confirmed a significant correlation between prosperity, the number of COVID-19
cases, and the number of deaths at the 99% level.
Conclusion: New emerging pandemics affect all nations. In order to increase the likelihood of successfully
managing future events, it is important to consider preexisting health security, valid population-based
management approaches, medical decision-making, communication, continuous assessment, triage,
treatment, early and complete physical distancing strategies, and logistics. These elements cannot be
taught on-site and on occasion. There is a need for innovative and regular educational activities for
all stakeholders committed to safeguarding our future defense systems concerning diagnostic, protec-
tion, treatment, and rehabilitation in pandemics, as well as other emergencies.
Key Words: COVID-19, mortality, pandemic, prosperity, public health emergencies
According to the World Health Organization(WHO), pandemics occur when a new typeof virus emerges and spreads around the
world. In most cases, pandemics originate from animal
influenza viruses, affect all age groups, and result in
self-limited illness as well as full recovery without
treatment.1 These diseases create complex problems
because their severity and impact are much higher than
seasonal influenza. One reason for this is the fact that
a much larger number of people in the population
lack preexisting immunity. Additionally, a pandemic
can occur in cyclical influenza seasons or defy typical
epidemiological patterns, resulting in massive out-
breaks during the summer months (eg, H1N1).1-3
Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is no different. It
spreads primarily through droplets of saliva or discharge
from an infected person´s cough or sneeze. Most people
infected with the COVID-19 virus experience mild
to moderate respiratory illness; they also recover with-
out requiring special treatment. Vulnerable groups,
such as the elderly and those with underlying medical
problems, are more likely to develop severe illness.
The absence of specific treatments or vaccines for
COVID-19 has resulted in different non-pharmaco-
logical approaches to prevent and slow down
transmission.4,5 Countries have reacted differently,
with some prioritizing limited restrictions, whereas
others have enforced a long period of quarantine,
active testing, and symptomatic treatment.6
In the past, population-based management (PBM)
approaches have been effective in managing pandem-
ics because PBMs assess the unique health conditions
and needs of an entire target population. These
approaches specifically use efficient and effective
measures and/or interventions that are consistent
with community-specific cultural, political, and health
care values.2,3 However, the current approach to the
COVID-19 pandemic has largely departed from
PBM. The global response to this pandemic has been
troublesome and uncoordinated across countries due to
lacking emergency public health leadership as well as
varying political and economic actions. Consequently,
deaths from this pandemic have been significant
and policy division between states and countries
remains high.3
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
As the number of those infected (and deceased) increase con-
tinuously, the situation appears paradoxically worse in more
prosperous and developed countries, which are supposed to
have sufficient resources and knowledge to protect their
population. For instance, 6 out of 10 of the most severely
impacted countries listed on worldometer.info at the end
of May 2020 were among Europe’s most prosperous.4,6-10
According to the Legatum Institute, a London-based indepen-
dent educational charity institute with a global vision to see all
people out of poverty, prosperity consists of the following
12 pillars11:
1. Safety and Security – the degree to which conflict, terror, and
crimes have destabilized individuals’ security in the short- and
long-term
2. Personal Freedom – countrywide progress toward fundamental
legal rights, individual liberties, and social tolerance
3. Governance – the extent to which there are checks and
restraints on power and whether governments operate effec-
tively and without corruption
4. Social Capital – the strength of personal and social relation-
ships, social norms, and civic participation in a country
5. Investment Environment – the extent to which investments are
adequately protected and are readily accessible
6. Enterprise Conditions – the degrees to which regulations
enable businesses to start, compete, and expand
7. Market Access and Infrastructure – the quality of the infrastruc-
ture that enables trade and distortions in the market for goods
and services
8. Economic Quality – how well a state’s economy is equipped to
generate wealth sustainably and with the full engagement of
its workforce
9. Living Conditions – the degree to which everyone experiences
a reasonable quality of life, including material resources,
shelter, essential services, and connectivity
10. Health – the extent to which people are healthy and have
access to the necessary services to maintain good health,
including health outcomes, robust systems, illness and risk
factors, and mortality rates
11. Education – enrollment, outcomes, and quality across 4 stages
of education (pre-primary, primary, secondary, and tertiary
education) as well as the skills in the adult population
12. Natural Environment – the aspects of the physical environ-
ment that have a direct effect on people’s daily lives and
changes that might affect future generations11
These pillars are fundamental elements for a prosperous coun-
try and enable a country to build up necessary structure to com-
bat emergencies. Thus, why are these countries, at least in the
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, highly influenced?
One reason for the disparate COVID-19 impacts may be that
these countries have better infrastructure, health care, and
technical resources (eg, screening) to diagnose, follow up,
report, and communicate.12 These advantages, particularly,
more advanced and dynamic infrastructure, may, however,
lead to the opposite outcome and accelerate the spread of
the disease. On the other hand, less prosperous countries have
neither advanced infrastructure to enable quick air/physical
spreading, nor do they have well-organized health care systems
to treat and report infected cases. People in these nations are
initially isolated due to demography and geography. However,
survivors need to access their needs by moving to more popu-
lated areas, movement which either reveals their diagnoses or
exposes them to infection.13,14 Another explanation for the
paradoxical association between COVID-19 outcomes and
prosperity may be that other countries are systematically
underreporting cases, have diverse political systems and agen-
das, older populations, or a population with specific underlying
health conditions.13–17 For example, in some countries with
Islamic or Buddhist culture, death certificates are issued with
no autopsy, unless a crime is suspected. Consequently, the
number of infected individuals in a pandemic is underreported,
without any intention of subverting transparency.18 These
reasons may partially explain why countries with advanced
health care systems appear to be the most severely impacted
by this pandemic, but the overall connection remains an
outstanding question, which may change the course of man-
agement of future pandemics.
This study thus aims to clarify the association between prosper-
ity and COVID-19 outcomes and its implications for future
pandemic preparedness and management.
METHODS
This is an observational study using information from
2 online registries. The number of infected individuals and
deaths was obtained from worldometer.info, and the prosperity
rank of each country was obtained from Legatum Institute’s
Prosperity Index.10,11
Obtaining the Number of Infected Persons and Deaths
The data from worldometer.info were collected on 4 separate
occasions (May 21, May 28, June 4, and June 11, 2020). This
site contains, among others, data on the actual number of
infected cases and the number of deaths associated with
COVID-19.10 Since population sizes vary significantly
between countries, the number of total cases and deaths per
million persons was used. Due to the large number of countries
(n= 197) included in this registry, the first and the last
25 countries were initially included. However, many of the
countries at the end of the COVID-19 ranking list did not
have any prosperity ranking.10 Therefore, to include as many
nations as possible, the 26 most infected countries on the list
(1–26) and countries listed between 100 and 126 were
included (n= 52) (Table 1).
Prosperity Rank
A total number of 167 countries are ranked according to the
sum of rankings for each of the 12 prosperity pillars listed in the
Legatum Institute’s Prosperity Index list.11 The prosperity rank
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for each country on the COVID-19 ranking list was extracted
from this index. Any country or territory mentioned in the
COVID-19 ranking list that did not have a prosperity ranking
was excluded.
Other Indices
The World Economic Forum (WEF) global competitiveness
index (eg, quality of infrastructure, education system), Word
Bank country income classifications, and Transparency
TABLE 1
Included Countries 1–26 and 100–126 According to COVID-19 Ranking List During the Study Period and in 4 Different
Occasions
Ranked 21 May Ranked 28 May Ranked 4 June Ranked 11 May
Countries 1–26 United States
Russia
Brazil
Spain
UK
Italy
France
Germany
Turkey
Iran
India
Peru
China
Canada
Saudi Arabia
Chile
Mexico
Belgium
Pakistan
Netherlands
Qatar
Ecuador
Belarus
Sweden
Switzerland
Portugal
United States
Brazil
Russia
Spain
UK
Italy
France
Germany
India
Turkey
Iran
Peru
Canada
Chile
China
Mexico
Saudi Arabia
Pakistan
Belgium
Qatar
Netherlands
Bangladesh
Belarus
Ecuador
Sweden
Singapore
United States
Brazil
Russia
Spain
UK
Italy
India
Germany
Peru
Turkey
Iran
France
Chile
Mexico
Canada
Saudi Arabia
Pakistan
China
Qatar
Belgium
Bangladesh
Netherlands
Belarus
Ecuador
Sweden
South Africa
United States
Brazil
Russia
UK
Spain
India
Italy
Peru
Germany
Iran
Turkey
France
Chile
Mexico
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Canada
China
Bangladesh
Qatar
Belgium
South Africa
Belarus
Netherlands
Sweden
Ecuador
Countries 101–126 Guinea-Bissau
Hong Kong
SriLanka
Tunisia
Latvia
Lebanon
Albania
Mali
Niger
Cyprus
Costa Rica
Equatorial Guinea
Zambia
Paraguay
Venezuela
Burkina Faso
Andorra
Uruguay
Georgia
Jordan
Haiti
San Marino
Malta
Chad
Sierra Leone
Channels Islands
Slovenia
Haiti
Venezuela
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Lebanon
Albania
Hong Kong
Tunisia
Latvia
Zambia
Equatorial Guinea
Nepal
Costa Rica
South Sudan
Niger
Cyprus
Paraguay
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Sierra Leone
Uruguay
Nicaragua
CAR
Georgia
Jordan
Slovakia
New Zealand
Ethiopia
Slovenia
Mali
Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial Guinea
Lebanon
Albania
CAR
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Hong Kong
Zambia
Tunisia
Latvia
Paraguay
South Sudan
Niger
Cyprus
Sierra Leone
Madagascar
Burkina Faso
Andorra
Uruguay
Chad
Sri Lanka
Iceland
Lithuania
Mali
South Sudan
Slovakia
New Zealand
Slovenia
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Guinea-Bissau
Lebanon
Albania
Equatorial Guinea
Mauritania
Paraguay
Zambia
Madagascar
Hong Kong
Latvia
Tunisia
Sierra Leone
Niger
Cyprus
Burkina Faso
Jordan
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International’s Corruption Perception Index (to account for
underreporting of cases/deaths in certain countries) were also
used for potential association.
Infection Fatality Rate
To simplify the data analysis, the infection fatality rate (IFR), that
is, the number of deaths/number of infected cases, for each coun-
try on the list was calculated.19 The initial estimation of IFR by
the WHO was 1.4%. However, this figure was revised to 2% on
January 29 and February 10, 2020, and finally upward to 3.4% in
March. This rate has varied between 0.5% and 14% in different
countries and during various stages of the pandemic. The mortal-
ity rates are much higher than those of the seasonal flu.20-26
All the aforementioned information, that is, IFR, the COVID-
19 ranking, and Prosperity Index score, was inserted in an
Excel file and matched. A power analysis with a standardized
statistical power of 0.80 and medium effect size of 0.5 premedi-
tated the appropriate sample size to 200 observations. The
observations were collected on 4 occasions to achieve the
required number. Countries in the COVID-19 index that were
not included in the Prosperity Index were excluded. This
reduced the number of countries in the analysis to 49 on
May 21; 52 on May 28; 51 on June 4; and 51on June 11.
Once these data were compiled, an exploratory data analysis
was performed.
Statistics
The variables were defined in the computer program,
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 25.0 (SPSS; IBM
Corp, Armonk, NY). The statistical significance was estab-
lished at P< 0.05 and all tests were 2-tailed. The analysis stems
primarily from descriptive data and regressions.
RESULTS
Figures 1–4 show the relation between the fatality rate vs pros-
perity rank and COVID-19 rank. Each figure is presented as
FIGURE 1
Showing the Correlation Between Fatality Rate and Prosperity in COVID-19 Ranked Countries on May 21, 2020.
(a)
(b)
Does the Prosperity of a Country Play a Role in COVID-19 Outcomes?
4 Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness
a and b. The former represents the data from the first 26 most
significantly infected nations, and the latter shows the coun-
tries ranked 100–126 on the COVID-19 ranking list. The
numbers on the horizontal axis represent the COVID-19
ranking of countries, with number 1 indicating the highest,
and number 26 holding the lowest number of COVID-19
infections and deaths. In the prosperity-ranking list, low num-
bers represent countries with higher prosperity, whereas higher
numbers are countries with lower prosperity. The position
of each country is shown parallel to the y-axis (light bars).
Smaller bars represent more prosperity, and vice versa. The
dark curves represent IFR percentage, which is the risk of death
for COVID-19 in each country. Taller bars mean a higher risk.
The figures demonstrate a combination of countries with high
and low prosperity, indicating that COVID-19 has spread to all
countries, irrespective of their prosperity level. However, the
risk of being infected by the virus seems to bemore extensive in
prosperous countries. There are some exceptions: in Figure 1b,
numbers 17, 22, and 26 represent countries/areas, Andorra,
San Marino, and the Channel Islands, respectively, with no
prosperity scale.
On May 28, the same pattern evolved, although a few coun-
tries changed places. However, most of the countries from the
list on May 21 were there, showing higher risk for more pros-
perous nations to be infected by COVID-19 and consequently
higher death rates (Figure 2a). In countries with lower rates of
infection, both the prosperity and mortality chances were
limited. The only exception was point 8, a prosperous Hong
Kongwith lowmortality risk (Figure 2b) but a higher population.
Figure 3a and 3b shows the data from June 4 with the same
pattern. Most of the countries remain on the list with few
changes. In Figure 3b, Andorra is missing due to the lack of
prosperity ranking. On June 11, there are still some changes
FIGURE 2
Showing the Correlation Between Fatality Rate and Prosperity in COVID-19 Ranked Countries on May 28, 2020.
(a)
(b)
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in both lists of more and less prosperous countries. Some coun-
tries join the lists, whereas others move down but still show
high mortality and morbidity (Figure 4a, 4b).
In order to follow up on the progress of the disease, the IFR from
all 4 occasions were compared in all included (n= 29) countries.
The changes in risk progress or regress during the period of study
have no statistical significance. The IFR remains constant in
most of the countries, despite changing positions. The increase
of IFR in a few countries has been concordant with the sudden
increase of infection or death in real time. The WEF global
competitiveness index, Word Bank country income classifica-
tions, and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index were also matched against the COVID-ranking and
Prosperity Index data. Still, they did not add any new informa-
tion to the results.
The results of normality, measured by the Kolmogorov
Smirnov test, did indicate total cases and deaths to be signifi-
cantly skewed (Total Cases/1 M of population sig. 0.00,
Deaths/1 M of population sig. 0.00). Due to the skewness
and the fact that prosperity was presented as ranks, a non-
parametric Spearman’s rho test was chosen to measure
co-variations of the data sampled in May and June 2020.
Extreme outliers were deleted from the test, that is, Qatar,
Andorra, and San Marino. The test confirmed a significant
correlation between prosperity, cases, and deaths at the
99% level (Tables 2 and 3).
DISCUSSION
This study indicates that a pandemic affects all nations irre-
spective of their prosperity, development, and the amount
FIGURE 3
Showing the Correlation Between Fatality Rate and Prosperity in COVID-19 Ranked Countries on June 4, 2020.
(a)
(b)
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and type of measures they may implement after the outbreak,
since measures and treatment are only useful when directed
to the cause and in the early stages. As recently reported,
because many cases of COVID-19 are asymptomatic and
without any clinical signs, it is almost impossible to initiate
any medical activity.1-3,27 Furthermore, there seems to be
a correlation between COVID-19 infection and a nation’s
grade of prosperity. Countries that are more prosperous seem
to be more troubled, and the spread of the infection is faster.
Consequently, the fatality rate also differs between countries
and is higher in wealthy nations. The results of the non-
parametric Spearman’s rho test, which measures co-variations
of the data sampled in May and June 2020, confirmed
this significant correlation between prosperity, infections,
and the number of deaths at the 99% level (see Tables 2
and 3).
FIGURE 4
Showing the Correlation Between Fatality Rate and Prosperity in COVID-19 Ranked Countries on June 11, 2020.
(a)
(b)
TABLE 2
Ranks and Statistics of Prosperity, Total Cases Per 1 Million of Population
Prosperity Rank
Total Cases of COVID-19 Per 1 M
Population
Prosperity Rank Correlation coefficient 1.0 -0.644
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00
Total Cases of COVID-19
Per 1 M Population
Correlation coefficient -0.644 1.0
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00
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These are interesting observations that need to be explored
in more detail and in larger samples since they may influence
future planning in the management of pandemics. It is evident
that similar unexpected pandemics will emerge in the future
and traditional management strategies may be inadequate
and health care resources insufficient.20-28 Consequently, there
will be little chance, if any, to influence pandemics’ impacts
and fatality rates during the incubation period. Therefore,
a proactive approach should replace the reactive strategy in
pandemics, as described in the WHO’s sustainable develop-
ment goals.29 Such proactivity includes data-driven risk assess-
ment, planning and mitigation strategies, and transparent and
quick medical decision-making.
Although all elements in the Prosperity Index are crucial for
the development of a country, they may create opportunity
for emerging diseases, and higher risk for viral spread and
mortality in a pandemic.11 Safety, security, and personal
freedom enhance societal engagement, mass gatherings, trav-
eling, and use of social media, and thereby attenuate physical
distancing strategies, quarantine rules, and increased contact
spreading, as well as rumors.9,17,30-32 Social capital enhances
civic participation, changes norms and cultures, develops
the needed social resiliency in responding to crisis, and enables
flexible surge capacity. Its absence, on the other hand,
results in sociocultural insufficiency and significant depend-
ency on authorities and professional forces in the immediate
response period to emergencies.30,31 The combination of a
well-established investment environment, enterprise condi-
tions, andmarket access and infrastructure promotes economic
development and prosperity. It creates new mitigation and
response opportunities and increases public access to services
and basic necessities of life. However, if politicized, these
factors influence medical and welfare decisions and result
in unfair resource distribution. They can also force people
in underserved communities to search for basic needs of
survival and prevent both physical distancing and quarantine
advantages.15,30
Poor living conditions and the natural environment
help spread diseases and foster unhealthy individuals.
Unhealthiness, in turn, increases the risk for adverse medical
conditions and complications related to emergencies, includ-
ing pandemics.17,30,33 Such conditions may also exist in a
prosperous country. In a recent Swedish publication, large
differences in excess mortality fromMarch–May 2020 by coun-
try of birth in Sweden were reported when compared to the
same period in 2019. The report indicated the shortcoming
of the Swedish strategy for not accounting for difficulties of
conducting voluntary physical distancing in neighborhoods
with household overcrowding, dependence on public trans-
port, and large proportions of service sector workers. Such
neighborhoods are typically inhabited by a larger proportion
of immigrants. The comparison of all-cause-mortality data
by country of origin from 2016–2020 showed large disparities.
The number of deaths among persons born in countries from
which many refugees have migrated to Sweden in the last few
decades was 220% higher from March–May 2020 compared
with the mean between 2016 and 2019. In contrast, there
was no increased mortality among persons ages 40–64 years
and a 19% increase in the number of deaths of those ages over
65 years born in Sweden, the EU, or North America during
these 3 months. These observations further illustrate the need
for a dedicated and more diverse strategy in dealing with the
pandemic.17
Educational initiatives can increase necessary public knowl-
edge and skills to respond to crisis in adult and younger pop-
ulations and enable the understanding and implementation of
recommendations given by authorities. However, they must
involve the right and appropriate target groups, be evaluated
properly and continuously, and be repeated within a prede-
signed and evidence-based period.30,31 Finally, all of the
aforementioned measures need a trustful and evidence-based
governance to manage the crises, to increase the efficiency
of measures, to ease up the implementation process, to prevent
and mitigate the pandemic, and to enhance citizen’s social
engagement. Defective governance results in concentrated
power, economic corruption, limitation of democratic values,
and missed mitigation and prevention opportunities.15,34
In prosperous countries, the risk for interaction between peo-
ple and the spread of a pandemic seems to be more extensive.
These nations have a well-developed infrastructure and
logistics to support internal and international communica-
tions, as well as economic and enterprise activity. Shorter com-
munication necessary between different parts of the country
through the air and ground enables the disease to spread faster.
TABLE 3
Ranks and Statistics of Prosperity, Deaths Per 1 Million of Population (N= 201)
Prosperity Rank
Total Deaths of COVID-19 Per 1 M
Population
Prosperity Rank Correlation coefficient 1.0 -0.622
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00
Deaths from COVID-19
Per 1 M Population
Correlation coefficient -0.622 1.0
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00
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This may explain themore rapid spread of COVID-19 and thus
higher risk for infection and deaths in the current pandemic.
However, although not to the same extent, less prosperous
countries seem to catch up and suffer from the pandemic, since
the shortcomings in public services and the lack of necessary
life-items push isolated communities toward more intensive
and higher density areas. These challenges may call for more
up-to-date, sustainable infrastructure development and new
public health strategies.30,32,35-38
Although this study may indicate that a pandemic is inevitable
and hard to stop, it also encourages fundamental hygiene mea-
sures, including early and complete physical distancing strate-
gies, knowledge of triggering factors, and ways that a pandemic
can spread. These are crucial elements of public education and
public health measures, which should be initiated long before
any pandemic starts. The public health authorities should have
the responsibility, mandate, and needed resources for initiating
and implementing various activities to mitigate the risks for
future pandemics proactively, to create more flexible surge
capacity, and promote a multidisciplinary workforce, structure,
and system.30,31,35-37
No country is immune to the consequences of a pandemic.
Each nation has its own unique resources, knowledge, compe-
tences, and capabilities. For example, in Brazil, Pakistan, and
Ethiopia, staff between the ages of 18 and 30, with an antici-
pated low risk of infection, were recruited to support the older
population, who were isolated at their homes. The strategy
resulted in positive outcomes and was recommended for fur-
ther implementation in other countries.30,35,36 Nevertheless,
various nations have to consider several political, economic,
sociocultural, and religious factors, of which the most decisive
might be the political and economic factors, which directly
influence sociocultural and spiritual factors.3 Individual
countries remain responsible for the management of a
crisis within their borders and should continue developing
relationships with leading health care organizations, such as
the WHO. Global health institutions, such as the WHO
and International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, should be free of political and economic
influence.15,36,39,40 Public health should strengthen its position
as the leader in crisis by activating civilians and health care
resources with guidelines and recommendations adjusted to
each country.3,30 This is necessary to develop early warning
systems and educational initiatives adjusted to different types
of crises. A pandemic warning system instructs the population
to act and implement various measures in different phases of a
pandemic.41 Targeted educational initiatives will empower
civilians and enhance interagency collaborations.30,31
Limitations
The main limitation of this study is the changing variables in
the COVD-19 ranking site, including the number of deaths,
infected population, the population density, and reporting
validity. Additionally, in this study, 1 factor (ie, prosperity)
was studied, whereas several other factors, such as prepared-
ness, risk awareness, resilience, and adaptability, also need to
be explored. Furthermore, the data for each country on the
Prosperity Index were compared with data from the
Corruption Perception Index, and no added information
could be obtained. However, no statistical analysis was
performed to verify the significance of the results. Finally,
there is no comparable study to match with the results of
this study.
CONCLUSION
There have been pandemics before, and new ones will occur.
The threat of several additional waves of COVID-19 seems
imminent if mitigation efforts fail and a vaccine is not found
soon. New emerging pandemics may have no name, no symp-
toms, no treatment, and no vaccines.27 In order to increase the
likelihood of successfully managing future events, it is impor-
tant to consider preexisting health security, a valid PBM
organization, medical decision-making, communication, con-
tinuous assessment, triage, treatment, early and complete
physical distancing strategies, and logistics.15,17,30 These ele-
ments cannot be taught on-site and on occasion.
This paper aimed to be thought-provoking and debatable to
emphasize the need for innovative and regular educational
activities for all stakeholders committed to safeguarding our
future defense systems concerning diagnostic, protection,
treatment, and rehabilitation in pandemics as well as other
emergencies. Nations, irrespective of prosperity, are neither
immune nor able to handle a pandemic alone. New initiatives
should be undertaken to empower all countries, and future
studies of prosperity will help identify new global strategies
to effectively manage future pandemics.
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